佩岑尼克：法律论证理论的类型

2005-11-04 14:38:58 作者：佩岑尼克 来源：法律博客 浏览次数：0 网友评论 0 条

亚历山大·佩岑尼克 著   于庆生译       一、一般法学说：     一般法学说描述法律的来源及其论证，并将其体系化。德国的“法学方法论”（Juristische Methodenlehre）对此提供了最佳的例子。例如，卡尔·拉伦茨的著作（1983年）便具有如下的结构。它的历史性的部分包含了萨维尼对于法律方法的观点，当然是在其他一些观点当中。弗里德里希·卡尔·v·萨维尼是十九世纪最有影响的德国法学家。它还涉及到所谓的法理学的概念、科学实证主义理念影响下的法律理论以及所谓的利益法理学。最后，它包括由拉伦茨提出的新的法律方法，即所谓的价值法理学。系统的部分包含涵摄（subsumption）学说，也就是法律规定的一般规范与具体的司法判决之间的逻辑关系；包括证据学说，即告知律师如何评价提交于法庭的不同种类的证据；还包括法律规定的解释学说。最后，它包括关于法律概念和法律体系的讨论。     一般法学说还产生了关于其服务的目的和使用的方法的自我反思（self-reflection），例如关于法律中的理性标准。它还包括对法学家大有裨益的哲学工具和哲学洞察力。     一般法学说既不是纯粹描述性的，也不是纯粹规范性的。它完全符合斯韦恩·英（Svein Eng）关于法律措辞和论证中德描述性和规范性要素的一般理论（Eng 2003, 312 ff）。根据英的说法，关于有效的法律的表述既可以理解为对于现行法的描述，也可以理解为关于如何完善法律的规范性介绍。就法律措辞或法律方法的标准来说，没有什么规则可以帮助确定由律师做出的或者描述性，或者规范性的表述的通常类型。       二、相对性与比较研究： 波兰学者泽西·符卢勃列夫斯基（Jerzy Wróblewski，cf., e.g., 1992）发展了一种解释和执行法律规定的理性主义和相对主义的元理论，这意味着它并不是建立一种解释理论，而是一种关于解释理论的理论。因此，他系统阐述了关于条文解释的意识形态的理论。并且，他构建了一个关于条文解释不同的现实存在的和逻辑上可能的方法之分类，并说明了它们的功能。方法被用极其理性主义的方式改写了。主要的分析工具存在于两种解释指令的差别之中。因此，每一条文解释的方法都被描述为对条文的解释具有作为第一顺序指令清单的特征，备有与完全的第一顺序清单之间的选择的第二顺序指令的清单。作者自己并没有对任何方法表述赞同，但是他理解所有方法的要点。这种相对主义和理智自由主义（intellectual liberalism）是符卢勃列夫斯基所有作品的重要特征。他能够发现任何法律理论的理性的核心，不论对于其他人来说是多么不可思议。 简言之，符卢勃列夫斯基发展了一种元理论，这对于描述性和规范性集于一身的不同的法律理论和不同的法律论证理论之归类和比较很有用处。但是，他并没有明确阐述他自己的法律理论，或者法律推理理论，既没有描述（提供现实或概念的新知识），也没有规范。无疑，符卢勃列夫斯基的法律元理论是以深奥的哲学为基础的，但是他并没有公开承认。 符卢勃列夫斯基的方法类似于比较法的方法，难怪他在大约十个不同国家中，会成为比较条文解释和惯例解释课题领域，主要的知识人物（cf. MacCormick and Summers 1991 and 1997）。下列论证模式被应用在至少是考察到的国家的条文解释中： ——从通常意义论证； ——从专业意义论证； ——从上下文协调论证； ——从惯例论证； ——从类比论证； ——从法律的相关原则论证； ——从历史论证； ——从目的论证； ——从直接原因论证； ——从意图论证。（MacCormick and Summers 1991, 512ff.）   三、应用于法律论证的政治哲学和政治学： 另外一种描述性和规范性部分都包含的研究类型，主要存在于美国。它使用关于法律推理的资料来构建部分类似于哲学分析，部分是政治规划的理论。罗纳德·德沃金的理论是个很好的例子。 让我们先来看一段德沃金著作的片断： 诚实正直的判决原则要求法官尽其可能地识别出由一个表达一种连贯的正义和公平概念的作者——被拟人化的社会——所创造的法律权利和义务。……根据诚实正直法则，如果法律命题包含或源自于提供了作为社会法律实践的最佳建设性解释的正义、公平和程序合法原则，那么它们就是正确的。(Dworkin 1986, 225) 再有： 诚实正直法则包含了人民拥有法律权利，无论什么权利都是为作为整体的法律实践梯红最佳理由的原则引起的。(ibid. 152) 这样提出的理论并不是不受质疑的。作为一个例子，人们很可能援引如下的说法： 这是对于德沃金所主张的法律实践的正确理论是将法律实践置于“最佳见解”（best light）之中的理论的考察。德沃金使用“最佳见解”的意思是一种称心如意的或美德的尺度：法律实践的正确理论描述的是最为理想的实践，德沃金如是说。那么这为什么就是事实呢？理论的称心如意和它的真相之间又是怎么样呢？(Raban 2003, 243) 陷入与德沃金的理论的争论之中并不是我的目的。让我们只是观察一下他的理论包含的关于原则对于政策的绝对优先、关于平等的至高无上的价值、关于先在权利、关于对所有疑难的法律问题的唯一的正确答案，如此等等的众所周知的可辩论的表述。这些表述部分的是作者哲学背景的结果，部分的是对政治辩论有用的工具。 另外一个例子是威廉·埃斯克利奇（William Eskridge）的法条解释的能动理论（Eskridge 1991）。他主张，条文解释是作为对新的政治联合、新的解释者和新的意识形态出现之反应而变化的。显而易见地，它是一种描述。但是，他也表现出对于法条能动解释的同情的态度。此外，他也根据不同的“法理学规范性理论”——自由主义的、法律程序论的和反自由主义的——对法律解释的这种模式进行了讨论。最后，他讨论了条文解释理论完全适应现代民主政治的需要的规范性难题。   四、辩证方法——奥里斯·阿尔尼奥（Aulis Aarnio） 著名的斯堪的纳维亚学者奥里斯·阿尔尼奥一直致力于法律教义学（法律教条学）领域的写作。（cf., e.g., Aarnio 1997.）法律教条学的任务是法律规范的解释和系统化。这一这一任务是规范性的，与社会学的解释性任务恰恰相反。法律解释的两个基本需要是理性和可接受性。系统化的目标则在于以一种抽象的模式阐述法律规范，涉及到某些基础概念。系统化是法律传统的维护者。根据阿尔尼奥的观点，法律解释是一种涉及到受众的有道理的循环活动。法律的受众的显著特征是“相对主义的”，这是在承认关于评价的分歧的可能性这一意义上所说的。阿尔尼奥将这一相对主义与罗纳德·德沃金的所有法律问题只有一个正确答案的理论做了对比。但是，德沃金受到价值客观主义（value-objectivism）的约束，而阿尔尼奥自己的立场是相对主义的，甚至他的相对主义都是相对的，即所谓的相对于受众。阿尔尼奥的受众理论是他对法律理论所做的有创见的贡献之一。他花费自己的全部学术生命来理解社会背景中的法律推理。他将法律解释、法律制度和人类活动视为支撑性总体（overarching totality）的一部分。简言之，阿尔尼奥受到了伟大的哲学家路德维格·维特根斯坦（Ludwig Wittgenstein）的启发。阿尔尼奥将这一启发概括如下（(1997, 123-125)）： 至少下述观念似乎是与维特根斯坦式的思维方式交织（interwoven）在一起的。 （1）实用主义的法律叙述（实践），真正与法律文本的解释相关联，就其本质而言“大体上”（on the whole）是诠释的。…… （3）法律教条的解释是一种活动。……意义并没有在语言中被隐藏起来，可以从中进行辨识。它是在解释的创造性过程中被构建的，虽然并非自由地构建。…… （5）……一个法律哲学家，……并不试图确定关于律师或学者……应该如何行为的规范。实践生活不能由一个哲学家的房间来决定。……此外，法律哲学家的任务是重构主义的（reconstructivist）。他们努力找回我们语言和行为中隐含的特征，并使其明确化，也就是说“显而易见的”，以便使语言游戏（language-games）变得可以理解。…… （6）……律师试图澄清理想的规范世界的内容。用辛迪卡的说法，这方面的法律思考是平坦的……。这使得我们面对一个在近年来的法律理论中被广泛关注的难题，连贯性的概念。

五、本文作者的理论：

我自己的理论受到了泽西·符卢勃列夫斯基、奥里斯·阿尔尼奥、罗伯特·阿列克西（Robert Alexy）(cf., e.g., Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik 1981)，以及最近的伽普·哈格（Jaap Hage）(Hage 1997 and Hage-Peczenik 2000 and 2001)的影响。我总是聚焦于法律推理的连贯性的重构，只是把比较深奥的哲学作为帮助理解律师如何思考的工具来使用。在提供这样的哲学工具的著作中，我们应该提到柏林（Berlin）1998年关于价值多元主义的著作、库玻（Copp）1995年关于社会本位伦理学（socially centred morality）的著作、哈克（Haack）2003年关于认识论之基础论（foundherentism）的著作、莱勒尔（Lehrer）1997年关于认识论之融贯论（coherentism）的著作、史密斯（Smith）1994年关于道德理论中的陈辞滥调的著作，以及斯万顿（Swanton）1992年关于广泛的反思均衡（wide reflective equilibrium）的著作。近来，我还被如下的文字深深打动：

一个负责的哲学家只能系统地研究，除此之外没有选择。……任何一种哲学立场的完全充分的发展，都必须考虑到这样一种历史的观点，即他自己的思考是如何适应于更为宽泛的事物之体系的。（Rescher 2001, 43）

法律推理的重构包含着哲学性的反思。核心点在于，几乎所有的法律思想因为对于连贯性的依赖，都是可取消的、不可量度的（outweighable）和正当的。法律教义学是法律思想最为复杂的形式。我最近的一本著作（Peczenik 2004）广泛地论述了法律教义学。尽管法学家们以一般性为目标推进了法律教义学的发展，但是任何一种学说都存在源于道德关怀的考量的反例。

在叙述这一事实时，我的理论是描述性的，而不是规范性的。但是，它也是由作者作为法律上合宜的来做规范性地介绍的。换句话说，我的理论不仅是描述性法律教义学，­而且是部分描述性，部分规范性的，它本身属于一般法律教义学。

我认为，有效规范总是社会的，部分地内在于法律和法律实践，部分地以非正式方式在社会中发展。在这一规范性的社会中心理论（society-centred theory of normativity）的背后，存在着一种怀疑论的元理论。作为一个怀疑主义者，我怀疑任何一种形而上学、任何一种道德理论、任何一种认识论，我也怀疑任何一种反形而上学理论、任何一种道德虚无主义和任何一种知识的解构（deconstruction）。但是，即使是怀疑主义者也必须生活，这意味着对某种事物的信仰，虽然不太行得通。没有什么是确定的，但是对我来说，法律内在的规范性比相互争议的道德理论的规范性要确定的多。

我的理论是与苏珊·哈克（Susan Haack）关于知识的一般性理论相一致的。苏珊·哈克的理论告诉我们，知识是一种与经验性的证明相联接的连贯性体系。证明就像是解决填字游戏的难题，而经验性证据就像是解决这一难题的线索。(Cf. Haack 2000 and 2003)

几年前，在假定法律教义学是部分的描述性，部分的规范性时，我已经论述了所谓法律数据(Peczenik 1989, 143-144)。数据可以说是知识的“输入”（input）。对于法律研究来说，法律文本、相关政治现实的描述，以及法官的判决都是这种数据。法律研究应该试图将它们整理进一个带有信仰与偏好的连贯的体系之中。

道德哲学家经常讨论的是反思的均衡（reflective equilibrium），而不是连贯性。法律知识领域的反思均衡必须由经验性的证据加以限制，当然也受到其他因素的限制。

约翰·罗尔斯以如下方式在他的理论的特定语境中描绘了反思均衡的特征：

通过回溯与前行，有时变更约定情况的条件，有时撤消我们的看法……我认为，最终我们会发现关于初始状态（initial situation）的描述，它即表述合理的条件，也产生与我们经过适当删节和调整后的深思熟虑的看法相和谐的原则。（Rawls 1971, 20）

    我认为，法律证明中反思均衡的想法需要某些修正。这一均衡并不是自由的，它是一种特殊类型的均衡，也就是说：广泛的、受限制的、被分割的和充满通常被认可的陈辞滥调的。

单纯的反思均衡对于法律教义学而言太狭隘了，我们需要一种更为宽泛的均衡。在伦理学中涉及到宽泛的反思均衡：

宽泛的反思均衡是一系列由特定人持有的连贯的、三重的信仰，也就是说：（1）一组特殊的道德判断；（2）一组道德原则；（3）一组相关的背景理论，这可能包含道德的和非道德的理论。……这个人可能回溯或前行，修改他最初的深思熟虑的看法、道德原则以及背景理论，以便达到一种由（1）、（2）、（3）合成的均衡点。（Daniels 1985, 121; cf. Swanton 1992, 11ff.）

对于单纯的反思均衡观念的另一法律教义学偏离是这样的。一名法律学者在对原则和看法进行相互调整时并不是完全自由的，但是他又必须在法律所加的体系内做出调整。最终，法律教义学中的广泛的、限定的反思均衡被分割了。每一种法学理论都应该以与其自身有着内在一致性的规范为根据。然而，理论有着不同的范围。某些是相对狭窄的，如侵权法中的“相当因果关系”（adequate causation）理论；某些则贯穿了法律的整个分支，如私法。不过，对于法律教义学而言，存在着一种完全协调的、作为整体的结构，并且接纳、推理和偏好的综合体系对于法律是适当的。法律教义学的目的不仅在于法律体系内在的均衡，还在于与社会学或哲学的背景知识的均衡。法律与道德或政治有着规范性的联系。

法律教义学中的反思均衡是围绕着通常被接受的陈辞滥调来筹划的，而不是围绕严谨精确的观念。对于人类思想来说，陈辞滥调的重要性不能被过高估计。这一点不论是在科学领域，还是在道德领域都是显而易见的。尤其是，米歇尔·史密斯（1994, 39ff.）的描述，他说下述的陈辞滥调“包围着我们的道德范畴”，即某些人表示道德判断是专门实用主义的。还有支持我们的道德判断之客观性的陈辞滥调。其他人则告诉我们道德与天赋之间的关系。还有人研究道德的本质，也就是对人的关怀和尊重，如此等等。有些陈辞滥调则涉及到程序，如反思均衡。

通过依赖于接受和偏好的综合体系，所有那些对于法律中的反思均衡所加的限制，最终都成为无可非议的了（cf. Hage 2004, 100）。依次，这一综合体系又受到经验性证据的限制，限制的方式就是前文以苏珊·哈克的理论为基础所做的说明。

这一理论虽然复杂，但它有一个简单的要点。这一理论承认律师的推理必须停留在由政治体系所划定的范围限度内。另一方面，它也认可总体上的律师和部分的法律研究者可以并且应该以最理性的方式对法律进行再加工。只有通过后者的理性的规定，法律推理才能既协调一致，又符合正义。只有通过这一方式，它才能促进社会稳定性，而社会稳定性是发展和经济增长的必要的条件。

 

 

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Kinds of Theory of Legal Argumentation

 

By Aleksander Peczenik

 

1. General Legal Doctrine

General legal doctrine describes and systematises legal sources and legal arguments. German Juristische Methodenlehre delivers the best examples of it. For example, Karl Larenz’s book (1983) has the following structure. Its historical part includes, among other things, information on Savigny’s views on legal method.

Friedrich Karl von Savigny was the most influential German legal scholar in XIXth Century. It also gives information about the so-called jurisprudence of concepts; information about legal theory under influence of positivistic idea of science; and information about the so-called jurisprudence of interests.Finally, it includes information about a new legal method, proposed by Larenz, called jurisprudence of values. The systematic part includes, inter alia, the doctrine of subsumption, that is, the logical relation between general norms of legal statutes and particular legal decisions. It includes the doctrine of evidence, telling the lawyers how to evaluate different kinds of evidence presented for the courts. It includes

also the doctrine of interpretation of legal statutes. Finally, it includes a discussion about legal concepts and legal system.

 

General legal doctrine also produces self-reflection about goals it serves and methods it uses, for example about standards of rationality in the law. It also includes philosophical tools and philosophical insights useful for jurists.

 

General legal doctrine is neither purely descriptive nor purely normative. It fits well Svein Eng’s general theory of the descriptive and the normative element in legal language and argumentation (Eng 2003, 312 ff). According to Eng, statements about valid law can be understood both as description of existing law and as normative recommendation as to how to make the law better. There are no rules at the level of legal language or of legal methodology that may help us determine usual kinds of statements by lawyers as either descriptive or normative.

 

2. Relativism and Comparative Studies

The Polish scholar, Jerzy Wróblewski (cf., e.g., 1992) developed a rationalistic and relativistic meta-theory of interpretation and implementation of legal statutes. This means that he did not construct a theory about interpretation but a theory about theories of interpretation. He thus formulated theories about the

ideologies of statutory interpretation. He also created a classification of various actually existing and logically possible methods of statutory interpretation and indicated their functions. The methods were reworked in the most rational manner.

The main analytical tool consisted in a distinction between two kinds interpretative directives. Each method of statutory interpretation was thus characterised as a list of first-order directives, for interpretation of statutes, completed with a list of second-order directives, for a choice between competing first-order ones. The author himself did not endorse any of the methods, but he understood the point of all of them. Relativism and intellectual liberalism of this kind were important characteristics of Wróblewski's all works. He was able to find a rational core of any legal theory, however strange it might appear to others.

 

In brief, Wróblewski developed a meta-theory, useful to classify and compare various theories of law and various theories of legal argumentation, both descriptive and normative. But he did not explicitly formulate his own theory of law, nor a theory of legal reasoning, neither descriptive (delivering new knowledge of facts or concepts), nor normative. No doubt, Wróblewski's meta-theory of law was founded on profound philosophy, but he published no confession of this kind.

 

Wróblewski’s method resembles the method of comparative law. No wonder that he was the main intellectual figure of the project comparing interpretation of statutes and interpretation of precedents in about ten different countries (cf. MacCormick and Summers 1991 and 1997). The following argument types are

used in statutory interpretation, at least in the surveyed countries:

 

-The argument from ordinary meaning

-The argument from technical meaning

- The argument from contextual-harmonization

-The argument from precedent

- The argument from analogy

- The argument from relevant principles of law

- The argument from history

- The argument from purpose

-The argument from substantive reasons

-The argument from intention. (MacCormick and Summers 1991, 512ff.)

 

3. Political Philosophy and Politics applied to Legal Argumentation

 

Another kind of research, containing both descriptive and normative components, exists mostly in the United States. It uses information about legal reasoning to construct theories which in part resemble philosophical analysis, in part political programmes. Ronald Dworkin’s theory is a good example.

 

Let us read some fragments of Dworkin’s writings:

 

The adjudicative principle of integrity instructs judges to identify legal rights and duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by a single author - the community personified - expressing a coherent conception of justice and fairness. [……] According to law as integrity, propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice. (Dworkin 1986, 225)

 

Moreover:

 

Law as integrity [……] holds that people have as legal rights whatever rights are sponsored by the principles that provide the best justification of legal practice as a whole. (ibid. 152)

 

Such a theory, appealing as it is, is not beyond doubt. As an example, one can quote the following leaflet:

 

This is an examination of Ronald Dworkin's claim that the true theory of legal practice is the theory that puts legal practice in its 'best light'. By 'best light' Dworkin means a measure of desirability or goodness: the true theory of legal practice, says Dworkin, portrays the practice at its most desirable. Now why would that be the case? What's between the desirability of a theory and its truth? (Raban 2003, 243)

 

It is not my intention to be entrapped in a dispute with Dworkin’s theory. Let me merely state that his theory includes notoriously contestable statements about categorical priority of principles over policies, about equality as the sovereign value, about pre-existing rights, about the only right answer to all hard legal questions and so on. Such statements are partly a result of the author’s philosophical background, partly a useful tool for political debate.

 

Another example is William Eskridge’s dynamic theory of statutory interpretation (Eskridge 1991). His argues that statutory interpretation changes in response to new political alignments, new interpreters, and new ideologies. Apparently, it is a description. However, he also reveals sympathetic attitude towards dynamic interpretation of statutes. Moreover, he enters a discussion about legitimacy of this style of legal interpretation in the light of different normative theories of jurisprudence-- liberal, legal process, and anti-liberal. Finally, he discusses the normative problem which theory of statutory interpretation best fits the requirements of modern democracy.

 

4. Dialectic Approach--Aulis Aarnio

The well-known Scandinavian scholar, Aulis Aarnio has devoted many writings to legal doctrine (legal dogmatic); cf., e.g., Aarnio 1997. The tasks of legal dogmatic are interpretation and systematization of legal norms. This task is normative,

in contrast to the explanatory task of sociology. Two basic demands of legal interpretation are rationality and acceptability. Systematization aims at reformulation of legal norms in an abstract manner, in relation to certain basic concepts.

Systematization is a bearer of legal tradition. According to Aarnio, legal interpretation is a hermeneutic activity justifiable in relation to an audience. Legal audience is characterized as essentially "relativistic", in the sense of admitting the possibility of disagreement about evaluations. Aarnio contrasts this relativism with Ronald Dworkin's theory of only right answer to all legal questions. Whereas Dworkin is bound to commit himself to value-objectivism, Aarnio’s own position is relativist, but this relativity is also relative, namely relative to the audience. Aarnio's theory of audience is one of his original contributions to legal theory. He has all his scholarly life aimed at understanding legal reasoning in the context of society. He sees legal interpretation, legal institutions and human actions, as parts of overarching totality. In brief, Aarnio has been inspired by the great philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Aarnio has summarised this inspiration, as follows

(1997, 123-125):

 

At least the following ideas seem to be interwoven in the Wittgensteinian way of thinking.

 

 (1) Practical legal discourse (praxis), in this very connection, the interpretation of legal texts, is "on the whole" hermeneutic by nature. [……]

(3) Legal dogmatical interpretation is an activity. [……] Meaning is not concealed in language and to be picked out from there. It is constructed, although not freely constructed, in the creative process of the interpreter. [……]

(5) [……] A legal philosopher, [……] is not to try and set norms as to how lawyers or scholars [……] should act.

The practical life cannot be dictated from the

chamber of a philosopher. [……] Yet, the task of a legal philosopher is a reconstructivist one. He tries to recover the implicit features of our language and behaviour making them explicit, i.e. "visible" so that the language-games become understandable. [……]

(6) [……] Lawyers try to clarify the content of the ideal normative world. Yet, legal thinking in this respect is horizontal, to use the expression of Hintikka [……]. This leads us to a problem that has been extensively considered in the

legal theory of the recent years, the concept of coherence.

 

5. The Theory of the Present Author

 

My own theory has been influenced by Jerzy Wr¨®blewski, Aulis Aarnio, Robert Alexy (cf., e.g., Aarnio, Alexy and Peczenik 1981), and later by Jaap Hage (Hage 1997 and Hage-Peczenik 2000 and 2001). I have always focused on coherent reconstruction of legal reasoning, using more profound philosophy only as a tool that helps understand how the lawyers think. Among writings delivering such philosophical tools, let me mention Berlin 1998 on value pluralism; Copp 1995 on socially centred morality; Haack 2003 on foundherentism in epistemology; Lehrer 1997 on coherentism in epistemology; Smith 1994 on platitudes in moral theory; and Swanton 1992 on wide reflective equilibrium. Recently, I have also been deeply impressed by the following words:

 

The conscientious philosopher has no alternative but to proceed systematically. [……] The fully adequate development of any philosophical position has to take into view the holistic issue of how its own deliberations fit into the larger scheme of things. (Rescher 2001, 43)

 

The reconstruction of legal reasoning includes philosophical reflections. The central point is that almost all legal thinking is defeasible, outweighable and justifiable by recourse to coherence. Legal doctrine is the most elaborated form of

legal thinking. My latest book (Peczenik 2004) deals extensively with legal doctrine. Though jurists developing legal doctrine aim at generality, whatever they say is open to counterexamples which originate from weighing of moral considerations.

 

When stating that it is the case, my theory is descriptive, not normative. But it is also normatively recommended by the author as legally correct. In other words, my theory not only describes legal doctrine but, being partly descriptive, partly normative, itself belongs to general legal doctrine.

 

In my opinion, binding norms are always social, in part inherent in the law and legal practice, in part developed in the society in informal manner. Behind this society-centred theory of normativity, there is a sceptical meta-theory. Being a

sceptic, I doubt any metaphysics, any moral theory, any epistemology, and I also doubt any anti-metaphysical theory, any moral nihilism and any deconstruction of knowledge. But even a sceptic must live, and this implies believing in some things, though defeasibly. Nothing is certain, but inner normativity of the law appears to me as less uncertain than normativity grounded on moral theories which quarrel with each other.

 

My theory is in agreement with Susan Haack’s general theory of knowledge. Susan Haack’s theory tells us that knowledge is a coherent system linked to experiential evidence. Justification is like solving crossword puzzles. Experiential evidence is like clues to such puzzles. (Cf. Haack 2000 and 2003).

 

Some years ago, assuming that legal doctrine is in part descriptive and in part normative, I have written about legal data (Peczenik 1989, 143-144). The data are so to say ¡°input¡± of knowledge. Both the letter of the law, the description of

politically relevant facts and the judgments of justice are such data for legal researchers. Legal researchers should try to arrange them into a coherent system of beliefs and preferences.

 

Instead of coherence, moral philosophers talk often about reflective equilibrium. Reflective equilibrium in legal knowledge must be constrained by experiential evidence, but it is also constrained by other factors.

 

John Rawls has characterized reflective equilibrium in the particular context of his theory in the following manner:

 

By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [...] I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. (Rawls 1971, 20)

 

In my opinion, the idea of reflective equilibrium in legal justification requires some modifications. This equilibrium is not free. It is equilibrium of a peculiar

kind, namely

 

wide,

 

constrained,

 

segmented and,

 

around commonly accepted platitudes.

 

Simple reflective equilibrium is too narrow for the legal doctrine. We need a wider equilibrium. Concerning wide reflective equilibrium in morality:

 

A wide reflective equilibrium is a coherent triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person; namely, (a) a set of particular moral judgments; (b) a set of moral principles; and (c) a set of relevant background theories, which may include both moral and nonmoral theories.[……] The agent may work back and

forth, revising his initial considered judgments, moral principles, and background theories, to arrive at an equilibrium point that consists of the triple (a), (b), and (c). (Daniels 1985, 121; cf. Swanton 1992, 11ff.)

 

Another deviation of legal doctrine from the simple idea of reflective equilibrium is this. A legal scholar is not entirely free to adjust principles and judgments to each other but he must do it within the framework imposed by the law. Finally, wide and constrained reflective equilibrium in legal doctrine is segmented. Each juristic theory should according to its own standards be coherent for itself, internally. However, the theories have different scopes. Some are relatively narrow, such as the theory of adequate causation in the law of torts. Others cover a whole branch of law, such as private law. At the same time, there exists a total unifying structure for the legal doctrine as a whole, and at the end the total system of acceptances,

reasonings and preferences relevant for the law. Legal doctrine aims not only at internal equilibrium of legal system, but also at equilibrium with background knowledge of society and philosophy. The law is linked normatively to morality or politics.

 

Reflective equilibrium in legal doctrine is arranged around commonly accepted platitudes, not around precise ideas. The importance of platitudes for human thinking cannot be overestimated. It is obvious both in science and in morality.

Especially, Michael Smith (1994, 39ff.) stated that the following platitudes are surrounding our moral concepts.…… Some indicate that moral judgement is especially practical. There are also platitudes that give support to our idea of the objectivity of moral judgement. Others tell us about the relation between the moral and the natural. Yet others deal with substance of morality, namely concern and respect for a person, etc. Some platitudes concern procedures, for instance reflective equilibrium.

 

All those constraints on reflective equilibrium in the law are ultimately justifiable by recourse to a total system of acceptances and preferences (cf. Hage 2004, 100). It its turn, this total system is constrained by experiential evidence, in a manner explained above on the basis of Susan Haack¡¯s theory.

 

This theory is complex but it has a simple point. The theory recognises that the lawyers¡¯ reasoning must stay within the limits outlined by the political system. On the other hand, it also recognises that the lawyers in general and the

legal researchers in particular may and should re-work the law in the most rational manner. Only by following the requirements of rationality, legal reasoning can achieve both harmony and justice. Only in this way, it may promote social stability which is a necessary condition of progress and economic growth.

 

 

 

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Aarnio, Aulis, Robert Alexy, and Aleksander Peczenik. 1981. The Foundation of

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Berlin, Isaiah. 1998. On Value Pluralism. New York Review of Books, Vol XLV,

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